Law of Trespass
When considering Private property the Law of trespass holds influence in respect to unauthorised parking suffered by the Land Owner.
Anyone choosing to park their vehicle on Private Property without authorisation or consent from the legal owner is considered to be Trespassing for any period whilst their vehicle is parked.
When trespass can be proved, any land owner, is entitled to recover nominal damages whether or not actual loss has occurred.
If the act of unauthorised parking has resulted in loss or damage to the land owner then they are entitled to compensation for that loss.
Before any land owner is able to claim costs in relation to trespass by the use of PPN’s then there must be sufficient and easily seen Warning Signage erected around the area explaining the consequences to unauthorised parking.

Contractual Law
With respect to the issue of PPN’s the crux lies in their being prominent and sufficient signage around the area. Such signs clearly wearn of the Parking Regulations. When any driver chooses to park on Privately Owned Land they are entering a Contractual Agreement to pay the charges illustrated on the Warning Signage if they park in contravention to the published regulations.

Data Protection
ParkWatch UK will not disclose any information regarding the land owner of the property or the registered Keepers Details of any parking offenders. This is in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998

ARTHUR v. ANKER (1995)
CASE TO DETERMINE WHETHER CLAMPING ON PRIVATE LAND AND REQUEST OF RELEASE FEE WAS LAWFUL.

The case began by stating that the leasehold owners of a site used as a private car park employed a wheel clamping company to prevent unauthorised parking.
The Wheel clamping Company displayed site warning notices at the entrance to and on the site. The Signs warned that vehicles parked without authority would be clamped, that a specified release fee would be charged and that obstructing vehicles might be towed to the wheel clamping company’s pound.

In accordance with the warning notices the company clamped a car parked on the site by the first plaintiff without authority. The first plaintiff refused to pay the release fee. The second plaintiff arrived at the site in a pick-up truck, and when the first defendant attempted to clamp that vehicle, the second plaintiff assaulted and abused him. Later the plaintiffs removed the clamped car together with the wheel clamper’s locks and clamps.
In proceedings brought by the individuals who had been clamped, for damages, for malicious falsehood and tortuous interference with their car, the wheel clamper counterclaimed for assault and the cost of the clamps and locks and asserted by way of defence that the first plaintiff's trespass entitled him to immobilise the car and demand the release fee as the reasonable cost of distrait, alternatively, that since the first plaintiff was aware of the notices he was to be taken as having consented to their terms.

The judge found that the first plaintiff was a trespasser on entering the site, that he had seen the notices and appreciated their effect. The judge concluded that the wheel clamping company had been entitled to exercise the remedy of distress damage feasant, that the fee charged was reasonable and that the first plaintiff had impliedly consented to the consequences of his trespass. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and entered judgment for the wheel clamping company on the counterclaim.

The Case relied on ‘distress damage feasant’ an old, medieval, self-help remedy, adapted to modern conditions. Put in simple English, if a landowner found property of another causing damage on his land he could seize the offending property and withhold it from its owner until adequate compensation had been tendered for the damage done. Although the remedy developed primarily as a means of protection against straying livestock, it was not limited to that. The judge thought it that damage should, in this case, be presumed, since land was a valuable commodity, car parking spaces were at a premium and a party entitled to use a private car park suffered loss if he was deprived of that use by a trespasser. The judge considered that the demand for £ 40 for removal of the clamp was reasonable and in no way extortionate, since that sum did little more than cover the wheel clamping company’s costs.

The second ground relied on was consent (or volenti non fit injuria). The judge held that Mr. Arthur parked in full knowledge that he was not entitled to park and of the possible consequences if he did. In those circumstances he was consenting to the consequences and could not thereafter complain of them. The effect of his consent was to render lawful conduct which would otherwise have been tortuous.
In Smith v. Baker & Sons [1891] Lord Herschell said:
"It was said that the maxim, 'Volenti non fit injuria,' applied, and effectually precluded the plaintiff from ‘recovering’. The maxim is founded on good sense and justice and ultimately means ‘One who has invited or assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong’."
"Consent, if present, negates liability. What must be established is that it was a consent freely given and extended to the conduct of which the plaintiff now complains."
In Cummings v. Granger [1977] the Court of Appeal, applying section 5(2) of the Animals Act 1971 (itself reflecting old common law authority), held that a plaintiff who entered a closed yard at night knowing that an Alsatian dog was loose within had voluntarily accepted the risk of injury.
"The common duty of care does not impose on an occupier any obligation to a visitor in respect of risks willingly accepted as his by the visitor."

The judge found that Mr. Arthur knew of and consented to the risk of clamping, and counsel for the Arthurs conceded in his written argument on appeal that this was so. But counsel argued that the demand for payment amounted to blackmail and that the commission of this crime negated the effect of Mr. Arthur's consent. It is enough to say that by voluntarily accepting the risk that his car might be clamped Mr. Arthur also accepted the risk that the car would remain clamped until he paid the reasonable cost of clamping and declamping. He consented not only to the act of clamping the car but also to the action of detaining the car until payment. The clamper can not justify detention of the car after the owner has indicated willingness to comply with the condition for release: the clamper cannot justify any delay in releasing the car after the owner offers to pay, and there must be means for the owner to communicate his offer. The judge held that the declamping fee was reasonable. The contrary has not been argued. The judge held that Mr. Arthur impliedly consented to what occurred, and he cannot now complain of it.